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NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-A PREMATURE
DESTRUCTION OF THE TORT LIABILITY REPARATIONS SYSTEM
IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CASES
On September 14, 1970, Senator Philip Hart introduced S. 4-3391 in the
United States Senate. This bill provided for a nationwide system of compulsory
automobile liability insurance under which any insured person involved in an
automobile accident could recover from his own insurance company his net
economic out-of-pocket losses, without regard to who was at fault in the accident.
Senator Hart's bill does away with the present tort liability system in automobile
accident cases and brings to a climax the national argument which has been
raging throughout the last few years over the fate of automobile liability insur-
ance.
While the automobile has become more essential to society, it has become
the target of much criticism.2 The question which is currently being asked
is whether the present system of automobile liability insurance is an effective and
desirable means of allocating the burden of loss associated with an automobile
accident.'
Automobile liability insurance was first written in 1898. Basically, this early
insurance protected against liability arising from the use of horsedrawn vehicles.
However, these first policies provided very inconsistent protection, and it was
not until May of 1935 that the first standard provisions of the automobile policy
were developed for nationwide use. The first family automobile policy was
written in 1956.'
From these rather recent beginnings, the automobile liability insurance
system has inherited a society which in 1969 alone produced 14 million accidents,
killing 55,500 people--one out of every 3,675 persons in this country-injuring
3.7 million people-one out of every 50 persons-and damaging 24 million
vehicles.' It is estimated that someone dies in an automobile accident every ten
minutes, there is an injury about every sixteen seconds, and the average driver
will have an accident every third year. The economic cost of automobile accidents
in the United States is over $16.5 billion a year. We have one car for every 2.4
persons; we produce cars three times faster than babies; and the automobile
population will increase by 30 million in the next decade to a total vehicle popula-
tion of nearly 135 million.'
The present automobile liability reparations system, based on the principle
that he who is at fault must pay, has been criticized as being too slow to pay
1 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This bill was still in the Committee on Commerce when the
91st Congress came to a close.
2 R. KEaToN & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH . . . THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND
INSURANCE REFORM (1967); R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
3 Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimburse-
ment, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967).
4 Gouldin, The Family Automobile Liability Insurance Policy, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 59
(1970).
5 See Cahill, Auto Insurance - A Call for Public Dialogue, 1 CONN. L. REv. 1, 3
(1968); Gouldin, supra note 4, at 60.
6 Denenberg, The Automobile Insurance Problem: Issues and Choices, 1970 INS. L.J.
455. See also Daniels, Michigan's Auto Insurance Ills, 53 AuTo. CLUB OF MICH., MOTOR
NEWS 10 (Jan. 1971).
[Vol. 46:542]
accident victims, too costly and wasteful, too impractical and cumbersome, and
too inequitable to handle the ever increasing volume of liability claims and prob-
lems presented to it.' Congress has supposedly' been swamped with complaints
about the rising costs of automobile insurance, the frequent insolvencies of in-
surance companies, the long delays in paying claims, the inadequacies of the
payments, and the arbitrary cancellation of policies.' As a result of these com-
plaints, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Transportation, and
five Congressional committees are investigating or planning to investigate auto-
mobile liability insurance." The Department of Transportation study is being
conducted pursuant to Congressional authorization and a $2,000,000 grant," and
will be the most comprehensive study and investigation ever made of the existing
system of compensation for motor vehicle accident losses. 2
The automobile claims system, as it presently exists, is a segment of tort
law-a body of law concerned with private redress for accidental and intentional
injuries. Under the existing tort system, the burden of loss in an accident falls
on the party responsible for causing the injury. This is what is termed a "third
party" reparations system.' The insurer pays benefits to an injured party on
behalf of its insured because of the insured's tort liability for an accident; an
insurer insures its customers against liability to a third person.
However, as this "third party" automobile insurance system has been in-
creasingly criticized, many suggestions have been made to replace it with a "first
party" insurance reparations system' 4 Under a "first party" system the insurer
pays benefits to injured parties (the insured, passengers in his car, and pedestrians
he hits) to discharge its legal obligations because of injury or damage sustained
by such persons in automobile accidents. A "first party" system attempts to
allocate the burden of loss in an automobile accident to all of motoring-rather
than to the party at fault. Senator Hart's bill proposes such a "first party"
system for the entire United States.
The first of many proposed "first party" plans was the Columbia Plan."
7 Keeton, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance - A Reform Tailored to the Need,
5 GA. ST. B AR J. 117 (1968).
8 Hodosh, Auto Compensation Plans and the Claims Man, 1968 INS. L.J. 816, raises
doubt as to how widespread the public's concern about automobile insurance actually is:
How truly widespread the American public's concern about auto insurance is may
be difficult to evaluate. . . .The House Antitrust Subcommittee .. .received 520
complaints from individuals up to September 20, 1967. Assuming that various other
investigative agencies and committees received about the same amount of complaints,
this would amount to 3,500 to 4,000 complaints on the federal level. If we consider
the fact that there are some 90 million cars in the United States, even conceding
that not all dissatisfied people go to the trouble of writing their congressmen or to
Congressional Committees - it is questionable whether, at the outset, this was truly
a "groundswell of public opinion." Id. at 817.
9 See Clarke, An Interim Report on the Activities of the Department of Transportation
as Regards the Reparations System, 37 INs. COUNSEL J. 192 (1970).
10 Hodosh, supra note 8, at 816.
11 Act of May 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-313.
12 The results of this study are partially completed. Brainard, The DOT Research Bomb, 6
TRIAL 37 (Oct./Nov. 1970); Brainard, Implications of DOT Auto Insurance Study for the
Tort Liability System, 1970 INS. L.J. 575, 576.
13 See generally Brandau, Compensating Highway Accident Victims - Who Pays The
Insurance Cost? 37 INs. COUNSEL J. 598, 599 (1970).
14 Id. at 599-604.
15 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL ri1 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT
BY THE COMMITrEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION POR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932). See also
NOTES
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Introduced in 1932, this plan proposed a "first party" system of compulsory
insurance which did away with the right to recover in tort and the right to
recover for pain and suffering. This plan, however, never dealt with problems of
property damage or the one-car accident. Nor did it consider the insolvent, un-
insured, or hit-and-run driver. The plan was never adopted in any jurisdiction.
The second "first party" plan to be proposed is, however, in effect today.
This is the Saskatchewan Plan,"e adopted in 1946. Under this plan, personal
injury benefits and claims for property damage are paid without regard to fault.
The victim of a traffic accident can still sue in tort, subject to the deductions
received under the plan. This insurance is written by a government-operated
insurance organization."
Also in effect today is the Puerto Rico "Social Protection Plan,"' which
became effective July 1, 1969. This is a social insurance plan with an outright
assessment of $35.00 for each car. It provides tort immunity for claims under
$1,000 and no recovery for pain and suffering under $2,000.
Perhaps the most widely discussed "first party" plan is the Basic Protection
Plan, proposed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell in 1965." The Basic Pro-
tection Plan provides compulsory automobile insurance, but limits recovery to net
economic losses. There is no recovery allowed for pain and suffering under
$5,000, and where collateral insurance coverages are present, basic protection
does not apply. Tort liability is eliminated for losses under $10,000. Above these
limits of $5,000 and $10,000, however, the present "third party" tort system is
retained.
The Basic Protection Plan was introduced in the Massachusetts legislature
in 1967 and defeated.2 ° But the basic proposal, this time with a $2,000 limit
on economic loss and a requirement of $500 in medical bills for pain and suffer-
ing recovery, passed the Massachusetts legislature on August 6, 1970.21 Also
included in this adopted version was a 15% rate reduction for all coverages.22
Since the passage of this bill, six Massachusetts' insurance companies have re-
fused to write new insurance policies for 1971,13 and the rate reduction has been
declared unconstitutional.
24
There are two other "first-party" plans which deserve consideration at this
Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 300
(1950).
16 The Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1963, 12 Eliz. 2, c. 38 (Saskatchewan), as
amended, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 51 (Saskatchewan, 1964).
17 For a discussion of the operation of this plan, see R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM, A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
140-48 (1965).
18 Automobile Accident Social Protection Act, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 2051 (Cum.
Supp. 1968).
19 R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 17, at 299-339.
20 Sugarman & Cargill, The Massachusetts Story: The Public's Reaction, 3 TRIAL 52, 54
(Oct./Nov. 1967).
21 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A [6 Advance Legislative Service 265 (Aug. 13,
1970)].
22 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 113B [6 Advance Legislative Service 302-03 (Aug.
13, 1970)].
23 Insurance, 6 TRIAL 17 (Aug./Sept. 1970).
24 Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Comm'r of Ins., - Mass. -, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970).
[Spring, 1971]
[Vol. 46:542]
point. One is the Rockefeller-Stewart Plan." This plan eliminates all tort liability
and all recovery for pain and suffering. The other plan is the American Insur-
ance Association Plan.2" It provides compulsory insurance and likewise does away
with all tort liability and all recovery for pain and suffering in automobile
accident cases.
Beyond these most noted plans, several other ideas for drastic reform of the
insurance system have been presented. One suggestion would allow the govern-
ment to control automobile insurance through the social security system.27
Another suggestion, made by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, is to remove all automobile and personal injury cases from federal to
state courts and try them without a jury.2"
These "first party" or no-fault plans have great political appeal. They fit
very well into the security and consumer-conscious mood of society. Yet although
such insurance has been ardently endorsed" it has also been vehemently at-
tacked,80 and the American Bar Association has gone on record as being op-
posed to the plans.3 ' The debate has been very involved,2 due principally to the
fact that once a "first party" system is adopted it may be difficult to return to a
"third party" system.s
All of these suggested "first party" plans contain certain common char-
25 STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT REp., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . .
For WHOSE BENEFIT (1970). This plan was endorsed by Governor Nelson Rockefeller. En-
abling legislation was also drafted and introduced into the New York Senate as Senate Bill
8922 (1970 Session). See also Brandau, supra note 13, at 602.
26 AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PERSONAL AND PROPERTY PROTECTION MOTOR
VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT (Draft 410, 1970). The text of this Act is contained in NEw
YORK AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
AND EVALUATE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCmENT
REPARATIONS (1968). See also Brandau, supra note 13, at 602.
27 Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815, 841
(1967); see also Moynihan, Are We Ready for a Drastic Change? 3 TRIAL 27, 30 (Oct./Nov.
1967).
28 South Bend Tribune, Nov. 15, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
29 Franklin, supra note 3; Hart, A Federal Answer to a Public Demand, 6 TRIAL 27
(Oct./Nov. 1970).
30 Foley, The Doctrine of Fault: The Foundation of Ex Delicto jurisprudence, 36 INS.
COUNSEL J. 338 (1969); Harrington, Compensating the Injured Claimant; The Keeton-
O'Connell Plan, 44 F.R.D. 133 (1967); Kierr, The "No-Fault" Flak, 16 LA. BAR. J. 315 (1969);
Kuhn, The Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan for Automobile Insurance: A Practicing
Lawyer's View, 22 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1969).
31 See State Specialization Experiments Authorized; Fault System for Accident Repara-
tions Endorsed, 14 AM. B. NEws 1 (Feb. 1969).
32 Until the passage of the new Massachusetts law and the introduction of Senator Harts
bill, this debate had accomplished very little. Most proposed plans faced the problem of being
adopted in one jurisdiction and operating wholly inconsistently with the law in neighboring
jurisdictions. But now there is a proposal for a national "first party" system which must be
examined very closely. Senator Hart's proposal does away with tort liability in automobile
accident cases other than where catastrophic harm occurs and exceeds the net economic loss
coverage. S. 4339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (9) (B) (1970). Catastrophic Harm is defined
in § 3(7) as:
[A] bodily injury (including death at any time resulting therefrom) which results
in a permanent partial or total loss of, or loss of use of, a bodily member, or a bodily
function: Provided, however, That such permanent partial or total loss, or loss of use,
need not affect earnings or earning power. The term "catastrophic harm" includes
permanent disfigurement.
There is to be no recovery for pain and suffering, and payments from collateral sources are to
be deducted from the amount recoverable under the plan.
33 The public, having chosen to surrender certain legal rights, would find it difficult to
regain them. Kuhn, The Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan for Automobile Insurance:
A Practicing Lawyer's View, 22 ALA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1969).
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acteristics which must be closely examined to determine if this method would
better allocate the burden of loss sustained in an automobile accident than does
the present "third party" system. First, these proposed plans are compulsory.
Second, they propose to reform the present system by doing away with fault as
the determinant of loss bearing. Third, they all limit or do away wtih recovery
for intangible loss-pain and suffering. And last, they all propose to limit mul-
tiple recovery for tangible loss.
The authors of "first party" or no-fault automobile insurance claim that this
new system would increase benefits and their availability, would return a greater
percentage of the premium dollar to the policyholder, and would do all of this
with greater efficiency and at substantially less cost to the driving public.3 4 They
claim that a no-fault system would be most compatible with the function of
insurance-compensating loss-and would be most consistent with the economic
principles of insurance in society-spreading the economic loss among all users
of the highway on the basis of probability, not causation.' 5 In effect, they wish
to have the cost of injuries caused in traffic accidents treated as part of the cost
of driving, to be spread among motorists in relation to advantages derived from
motoring rather than being spread on the basis of negligence principles.36
The authors of no-fault insurance propose to cure what they consider the
following problems of the present automobile liability reparations system: fault
is difficult to determine, and harsh application of contributory fault principles
leaves deserving victims uncompensated; courts are congested and there is a
substantial delay in getting to trial due to the amount of automobile accident
cases; allowing recovery for pain and suffering and from collateral insurance
sources is wasteful and inequitable; there are too many uninsured motorists;
companies frequently become insolvent and too many policies are arbitrarily
cancelled; and when payment is made under the present system it is too slow in
coming. Each of these criticisms of the present system must be examined in
depth to determine if they are valid.
I. DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING FAULT
One of the primary criticisms leveled at the present automobile liability
reparations system is that in automobile accidents it is often too difficult to
determine who was at fault. Likewise, application of principles of contributory
fault leaves many deserving victims uncompensated. The fault system has been
called a lottery system where victims with identical injuries recover different
amounts, where small claims are overcompensated, and where victims with large
claims rarely get as much as 251% of their real economic loss. 8 It is also claimed
that under the fault system some 25% of all victims recover nothing. 9
Professor Keeton believes that in the great majority of cases the automobile
34 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 29.
35 See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 7.
36 Keeton, Basic Protection - An Answer to the Automobile Insurance Crisis, 1 CONN.
L. REv. 13, 15 (1968).
37 See generally Keeton, supra note 7.
38 Franklin, supra note 3.
39 Id. at 779.
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accident is the fault of no one. The accident is merely the inevitable result of
the speed of automobiles, human frailties, and the rapid pace at which people
live. The victim of nonnegligent motoring accidents is thus left to bear his
own loss. 4 0 The critics of the fault system say that the difficulty in determining
fault causes unjustified expense and results in many wrong determinations. They
stress that it is unlikely that anyone could apply a rational judgment in allocating
responsibility between the parties on the basis of fault. Too much depends on
the memory and honesty of the witnesses for a determination of true facts.4 ' Thus,
they propose to eliminate all disputes over fault.
Contrary to the beliefs of these authors, a recent study conducted by the
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company demonstrated that in over 90% of all
automobile accidents, fault could be easily assessed-usually from only the facts
contained in the report of the accident. In addition, the claims men at Liberty
Mutual were asked to estimate in what percentage of the cases fault is easily
determinable. They responded, without knowledge of the study results, that about
75% of their own cases were susceptible to a clear determination of fault in the
original reports, and about 90% could be decided upon completion of the initial
investigation.42
Determination of fault would not seem to depend on total mental recall
alone. Physical science and accident reconstruction help. The final positions of
the cars, the tire marks and the location and extent of the damage frequently
establish very clearly how the accident happened and who was at fault. Complex
accidents can be accurately analyzed even where impressions of witnesses are
confused.
The belief that in the majority of auto accidents the accident is the fault
of no one43 is not very widely shared. It is usually found that collisions are almost
always caused by the careless driving of one or more drivers.44 It also appears that
most accidents result from a failure to follow the rules of the road. This, at least,
is the conclusion of one expert in accident reconstruction:
[I]t is my view as an engineer, with more than 20 years experience in traffio
safety research and accident reconstruction, that the great majority of
accidents would not have occurred if the legally mandated rules of the road
had been followed.4 5
The argument that in most cases fault is too difficult to determine is invalid;
in the few cases where it is difficult to determine, the use of experts clarifies the
situation. It would not serve the interests of sociey to abandon the tort system in
automobile accidents for the benefit of a few cases where fault cannot be
40 Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law? 53 VA. L. Rnv. 886,
890 (1967).
41 See, e.g., O'Connell, The Road Ahead: For Automobile Insurance, 1 CONN. L. Rlv. 22,
23 (1968).
42 Marryott, Testing the Criticisms of the Fault Concept, 35 INs. COUNSEL J. 112,
115 (1968); Marryott, Mystery of Who's at Fault Easily Solved, 3 TrAL 41, 42-43
(Oct./Nov. 1967).
43 Keeton, supra note 40.
44 Townsend, Basic Inequalities of Keeton-O'Connell, 17 DEFENSE L.J. 133, 136 (1968).




determined accurately. As for the argument that the harsh application of
principles of contributory fault prevents many deserving victims from recovering,
a system of comparative negligence, which is discussed below,4 8 would seem to
lessen the harshness of the present system.
The proponents of the fault system argue that determination of fault provides
a necessary deterrent effect in our society. One commentator has stated that
"the rule of liability based upon fault is an important contribution to a social
system such as ours where individual responsibility plays an essential role."4'
On the other hand, the critics of fault say that the deterrent effect of legal
liability is minute when compared with other deterrents such as fear of injury,
fear of criminal sanctions, and fear of losing one's license to drive. They point out
that liability insurance itself seriously undercuts the supposed deterrent effect of
judgments since it shelters tortfeasors from the very economic consequences that
are supposed to be the principal deterrent.4"
Those who favor fault, however, feel that possession of liability insurance
itself demonstrates acceptance of individual responsibility. Under a no-fault
system drivers will see accidents (since they would be accepted as inevitable)
as a social responsibility, rather than a personal one. They further believe that
abdicating the role of driver responsibility under the no-fault plans would
diminish the importance of the rules of the road in accident prevention. Under
the present system, any incentive to drive aggressively is effectively checked by an
increase in insurance costs."
The validity of either of these arguments is very difficult to determine. Yet
no matter what system is in effect-fault or no-fault-there is, one must admit,
a natural tendency to avoid accidents. In our society a car is a necessity, and to
damage it is, at the very least, inconvenient. Also, under the present system a
driver's rates are affected by his driving record, he risks excess recoveries, and
he has to bear the loss of his own damage and injuries if he is at fault. He can
only minimize this risk by increased care and caution.
II. COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY
Another criticism leveled at the fault system is that it creates court congestion
and delays victims of automobile accidents from receiving compensation for
their losses." It has been claimed that automobile accident cases are two-thirds
or more of a court's civil jury docket,"' and that it takes at least two years
between the filing of a complaint and the assignment of a case for trial.9 " This
delay is said to cause many victims to settle for inadequate compensation without,
46 See part XI infra.
47 Morrow, Fault Without Responsibility - An Anachronism, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 202
(1969).
48 Franklin, supra note 3, at 781; Keeton, supra note 40, at 889-90.
49 Foley, supra note 30, at 343-49; Lawton, supra note 45, at 349-52; Morrow, supra
note 47, at 205-06.
50 Cahill, supra note 5, at 4; Keeton, supra note 36, at 14.
51 Keeton, Elimination of Fault Principles and Collateral Benefits - Keys to Basic Pro-
tection, 3 TRIAL 15, 16 (Oct./Nov. 1967).
52 Cahill, supra note 5.
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or against, the advice of counsel." The solution under a no-fault system is that,
since there is no need for a determination of legal liability, these cases will be
removed from the courts.
It now appears rather conclusively, however, that automobile accidents
cannot be blamed for the court congestion in this country."" One expert states
that serious congestion and delay is confined only to fifteen metropolitan areas
in six states, while thirty-two states have no court delay whatever 5  Moreover,
automobile litigation makes up but 15% of our court dockets nationwide;"8 94%
of automobile liability claims are settled without any suit being filed; 4% result
in suits that are settled without a trial; and only 2% result in a trial with a
final verdict.57 More than two-thirds of all claims are settled within three months
and 90% of the cases are closed within a year. 8 Less than one-fourth of the
civil cases filed and tried in state courts are automobile liability suits. 9 In courts
where congestion does exist, it is often attributed to the increase in criminal
cases.6" Evidently the Department of Transportation's investigation indicates
that delay is often due to the priority given the trial of criminal cases and the
voluntary delay of parties filing lawsuits.61 Where congestion and delay do exist,
the appointment of new judges and the updating of facilities and administrative
procedures serve to eliminate most problems.2
Not all delay can necessarily be considered evil. Often the delay in bringing
a case to trial is due to the amount of preparation time needed by both parties.
Accidents must be investigated, doctors must be able to examine and treat their
patients in order to determine the nature and extent of loss, and medical costs
and wage losses are sometimes unascertainable until many months after an
accident.
Although one of the prime objectives of "first party" insurance plans is to
reduce court congestion, there are those who feel these plans will in fact com-
pound the existing congestion and delay." The authors of no-fault insurance
believe that under their system the victim of a traffic accident will simply notify
his insurer of his "net economic loss" and be compensated immediately. There
53 Id.
54 Barbeau, Court Delay and the Auto Accident Claim, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE 58 (Oct.
1966); Ross, DRI Studies Refute Court Delay Claims of Critics, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 46
(1969); Court Congestion - A Localized Urban Problem, 8 FoR THE DEFENSE 49 (Sept.
1967); Automobile Torts Not Cause of Court Congestion, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE 57 (Oct.
1967); Basic Protection - Diminished Justice at High Cost; 8 FOR T E DEFENSE 73 (Dec.
1967); Injury Lawsuits Not Sole Cause of Delay, 9 FOR THE DEFENSE 49 (Sept. 1968); Auto
Jury Cases Take Least Time to Try, 9 FOR THE DEFENsE 53 (Sept. 1968).
55 Ross, DRI Studies Refute Court Delay Claims Of Critics, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 46, 47
(1969).
56 Julien, Keeton-O'Connell: Myth or Panacea? 40 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 256, 260 (1968).
57 Martin, Morality and-'the Fault System, 40 Miss. L.J. 485, 487 (1969). See also
Claim-Payment Function Improvement Lauded, 9 FOR T E DE ENSE 18 (March 1968).
58 Martin, supra note 57.
59 Martin, supra note 57.
60 Marryott, Is the Keeton-O'Connell "Basic Protection Plan" Acceptable to the Public?
34 INS. COUNSEL J. 416, 418 (1967).
61 See Brainard, Implications of DOT Auto Insurance Study for the Tort Liability System,
1970 INS. L.J. 575, 577-78.
62 See, e.g., More Judges, New Methods Solve Delay in Connecticut, 9 FOR THE DEFENSE
17 (March 1968); Basic Protection - Diminished Justice at High Cost, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE
73 (Dec. 1967).
63 Jullen, supra note 56; Kemper, Keeton-O'Connell Plan: Reform of Regression? 3 TRtAL
20, 22 (Oct./Nov. 1967); Townsend, supra note 44, at 144-46.
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will be no delay in payment, no difficult determination of fault, no court claim
and no unjust recovery.
Under a "first party" system, however, there are still claims which may arise
and require court adjudication. When an injured party contacts his insurer, the
latter may very well contest the claim: were the medical expenses necessary and
reasonable, were they actually incurred by the claimant, would the money sought
as lost income actually have been earned, and is the claimant entitled to any
benefits from his automobile insurer (as his expenses may have been reimbursed
from collateral insurance sources)? Where agreement cannot be reached on
such issues, there is thus a potential lawsuit on the insurance contract.
It has also been pointed out that no-fault insurance would more than
double the total number of insurance claims. The sheer number of claims would
certainly engender disputes, and the traditional court remedies will have to be
maintained as the means of enforcing the provisions of the coverage. Thus, courts
of competent jurisdiction will, for example, have to issue orders compelling
physical and mental exams, occupying their time and turning them into admin-
istrative tribunals.
6 4
The argument that automobile accidents are responsible for court congestion
and delay cannot be sustained as a valid reason for removing the automobile
accident case from the courts. Where court congestion does exist, such procedures
as arbitration of small claims may be tried. Pennsylvania has had a great deal
of success with the use of arbitration in automobile accident cases where the
amount in controversy is $3,000 or less. 5 But at the heart of this entire system
is the preservation of trial by jury and the absolute right of appeal by any party
not satisfied with the arbitration result.
III. RECOVERY FOR INTANGIBLE Loss-PAmn AND SUFFERING
The practice of allowing recovery for the intangible loss of pain and suffering
is often criticized as being a major source of waste and injustice in the present
tort system." Pain and suffering, it is contended, is too difficult to determine,
there being no definite standards by which to gauge it and allow proper compen-
sation. No-fault insurance proposes to compensate automobile accident victims
for tangible, economic losses only, by completely denying or limiting recovery for
pain and suffering. Senator Hart's proposed plan denies all such recovery.
6 7
The reasoning put forth in favor of denying recovery for pain and suffering
has been severely criticized. Opponents contend that the right to recover for
pain and suffering in a motor tort case is not eliminated because pain and
suffering is incapable of measurement. Rather, they believe recovery is restricted
merely because no-fault insurance is designed to cheapen the cost by cheapening
the product.6 "
The courts have consistently held that pain and suffering is a proper element
64 Green, Basic Protection and Court Congestion, 52 A.B.A.J. 926 (1966); Townsend,
supra note 44, at 144.
65 Ryan, Arbitration Cuts Philadelphia Backlog, 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 42 (June 1969).
66 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 29; Keeton, supra note 36.
67 S. 4339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (2) (1970).
68 See, e.g., A Drastic Legal Change, 6 TRAL 22, 23 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
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of damages.8" In fact, verdicts awarding medical damages without a simultaneous
award of damages for pain and suffering have been held to be invalidY° Thus,
the right to recover for pain and suffering is a recognizable legal right which
should not be abandoned too quickly.
In any event, it is not necessary to adopt a no-fault system in order to effec-
tuate a denial of recovery for pain and suffering. Should the public decide it
wants a lower cost, insurance companies could provide it under the present
system by simply not providing pain and suffering coverage. Therefore, the
alleged waste and injustice in pain and suffering awards is not really a legitimate
argument for abolishing the concept of fault as the determinant of loss bearing
in automobile accidents.
IV. Limrrs ON RECOVERY FROM COLLATERAL SOURCES
No-fault automobile insurance plans propose to allow recovery for the net
economic loss of a victim less any recovery from collateral insurance sources.'
Allowing such recovery is said to constitute waste in the present system. 2 This
is another method to eliminate one risk of loss which an insurer must insure
against. If the amount payable to the victim of a traffic accident is reduced by
the amount he recovers from collateral sources, insurance companies will be able
to provide insurance at a lower cost to the public. A provision such as this would
have a substantial impact on the American public, as more than 83% of the
people in the United States are covered under independent, private hospitaliza-
tion insurance."
The critics of the present system believe that allowing recovery from both
collateral sources and automobile insurance provides a double award, allowing
the victim to make a profit and creating waste in the reparations system.7 4
Although this may be a valid point, even these critics claim that many times
victims aren't compensated at all or are undercompensated' s However, under
the present system if a victim is undercompensated or receives no compensation at
all he has the opportunity to turn to his collateral benefits to better repair his loss.
No-fault plans would require him to rely on this alone.
The authors of no-fault insurance claim that their plans will make motoring
pay its way."' Thus, as part of the price of operating a motor vehicle, everyone
must purchase a certain type of insurance coverage and forgo certain benefits,
such as being able to sue in tort and recover for pain and suffering. But, under
69 District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1890); Kennon v. Gilmer,
131 U.S. 22, 26-27 (1889); R.R. Co. v. Barron, 72 U.S. '(5 Wall.) 90, 104-06 (1886); Jenkins
v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1233 (4th Cir. 1970).
70 Pickel v. Rosen, 214 So.2d 730 (Fla. App. 1968); Massey v. Stephens, 114 Ga. App.
254, 150 S.E.2d 694 (1966); Yacabonis v. Gilvickas, 376 Pa. 247, 101 A.2d 690 (1954);
Feldstein v. Harrington, 8 Wis.2d 569, 99 N.W.2d 694 (1959). See generally Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 276 (1951).
71 See, e.g., S. 4339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (9) (A) (1970).
72 Hart, supra note 29, at 29.
73 Kuhn, supra note 33, at 9; Sargent, No Miracle Cure, 6 TRIAL 30 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
74 Keeton & O'Connell, The Basic Protection Plan for Traffic Accident Losses, 43 NomRE
DAME LAWYER 184, 186 (1967).
75 Id. at 185. See also Hart, supra note 29.
76 Keeton, supra note 36.
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the no-fault plans, the victim of an accident is forced to utilize his personal or
group accident and health insurance coverage to cover his expenses before no-
fault pays anything. Since most people are covered collaterally, isn't the burden
created by motoring accidents at least partially shifted from motoring to the
health and accident field? Automobile insurance would become secondary
coverage in an automobile accident and this may result in serious inequities.
7 7
Whether or not there would be such a result remains open to question. How-
ever, there is an obvious opportunity for fraud where reliance must be made on a
good faith disclosure of collateral sources. The likelihood of detailed investiga-
tions being needed to search out collateral sources could conceivably result in a
cost increase rather than a deduction. Moreover, it does not offend any tenet
of justice to allow one who pays a premium for coverage to be entitled to recover
under the policy-regardless of whether or not he is also covered under another
insurance policy. When one purchases something he should be entitled to
benefit from that which he has purchased.
Again, a denial of recovery under an automobile insurance policy where
collateral benefits are available could be accomplished under the present "third
party" tort system. In fact, some automobile insurance policies today are written
in such a manner. Should the public decide it desires a lower automobile in-
surance premium, this can, therefore, be accomplished without changing the
present system.
V. TiHE PROBLEM OF THE UNINSURED MOTORIST
Another complaint against the present automobile liability reparations
system is that in an accident involving an uninsured motorist his victim will go
uncompensated if the uninsured motorist cannot pay the claim against him.
Under a "first party" system the injured party recovers from his own insurer
and it does not matter whether or not the other party has insurance. In addition,
such systems are compulsory insurance systems.
Although the frequency with which uninsured motorists are involved in
automobile accidents is not known, it is estimated that 90% of the cars on the
road are insured.7"
Some states have attempted to handle the problem of the uninsured motorist
by making automobile liability insurance compulsory. 9 Most other states have
enacted financial responsibility laws which require a driver without liability
insurance to be able to post security or some guaranty of compensation in order
to avoid losing his driver's license. 0 Another approach, and perhaps the better
one from the injured party's standpoint, has been the development of uninsured
motorist coverage. Many states have enacted statutes requiring insurers to
77 Brandau, supra note 13, at 605-08; Ghiardi & Kirchner, Automobile Insurance: The
Rockefeller-Stewart Plan, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 324, 325 (1970).
78 Morris, Negligence in Tort Law - With Emphasis on Automobile Accidents and
Unsound Products, 53 VA. L. REV. 899, 902 (1967).
79 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A-34L (1967); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 310-
21 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to 20-319 (1965).
80 See, e.g., 15A IowA CODE ANN. §§ 321A.1 to 321A.5 (1966).
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offer uninsured motorist coverage.s In some states the coverage is mandatory,
and in others the insured has the right to reject the coverage. 2 Under such
statutes, if the party at fault is uninsured, the injured party's own insurer will pay
the loss.
The problem of the uninsured motorist can be dealt with under each system.
Under a "third party" system, an insured can purchase such coverage in addi-
tion to his liability coverage. With a mandatory "first party" system, each
insured, being required to purchase the insurance, just looks to his own insurer
for recovery without regard to fault and irrespective of whether the other party
is insured. This problem may thus be handled under either system, but the
question as to which is the best system for allocating the burden of loss in auto-
mobile accidents remains unanswered.
VI. INSOLVENT COMPANIES AND ARirrRARY CANCELLATION OF POLICIES
The insolvency of an insurance company and the cancellation of policies
are evils attributed to the present fault system. It is claimed that there are
more than 300,000 policyholders and victims of automobile accidents who hold
pending claims in excess of one-half billion dollars against total assets of insolvent
companies of less than $25,000,000.11
People who have several accidents are placed in assigned risk categories,
have their policies cancelled, and then must rely on companies specializing in high
risk insurance. These are the companies which most often become insolvent.
Certainly if insurance companies are able to arbitrarily cancel or not renew
policies, forcing people to purchase from high risk companies which may not be
able to provide any type of protection, reform is needed.
It cannot be seriously suggested, however, that the abolition of the fault
system alone will have an effect on insolvencies and cancellations. Although the
authors of no-fault insurance might include provisions in their plans which are
designed to eliminate these evils, these provisions exist independently of the "no-
fault" concept and could be adopted just as well under the present system.
Some states have enacted non-cancellation laws to protect the motoring
public. Iowa, for example, has recently enacted a law which provides that no
automobile insurance policy may be cancelled other than for nonpayment of a
premium or for loss of a driver's license.8 4 Under this law, a policyholder must
always receive notice of cancellation and a written reason for the cancellation.
The Iowa law further provides that no insurer may fail to renew a policy unless
notice is given to the policyholder. In the case of either cancellation or non-
renewal, the policyholder may request a hearing before the Commissioner of
Insurance. If he does make such a request, the insurer has the burden of proving
that the cancellation or non-renewal was reasonable. A. statute such as this
provides that cancellation or non-renewal Will not be arbitrary.
81 For a general discussion of the approaches taken by many states in this area see Graham,
Recent Interpretation of the Uninsured MotoristEndorsement, 4 THEr. FoRUM 160 (1969).
82 Id. i I
83 Hart, supra note 29, at 28; Cahill, supra note 5, at 3-4.
84 IowA CoDE ANN. Senate 'File 203 [1 Legislative Service 25 (Feb. 12, 1970)].
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It is also possible to provide that claims against an insolvent company will
be paid without doing away with the present tort liability system. Again taking
Iowa as an example, a state Guaranty Association has been established by statute
which will cover all claims, up to the face amount of the applicable policy, made
against an insolvent automobile liability insurance company. 5 The funds to carry
this out are assessed from each insurer doing business in the state.
VII. DELAY IN PAYING CLAIMS
Another criticism leveled at the present tort system is that oftentimes those
entitled to compensation have to wait too long to be reimbursed."5 Under the
present system the injured party must wait until legal liability has been estab-
lished before he can recover his losses. In the meantime he suffers financial hard-
ship while paying the bills incurred because of the accident. No-fault insurance
proposes to do away with the determination of legal liability so that the injured
party recovers his net economic losses as they occur, rather than waiting for one
lump sum payment." This is perhaps the most inviting feature of the no-fault
plans, but again it is possible to accomplish this under the present system.
Insurers now voluntarily engage in advance payment programs (payment in
advance of a determination of legal liability) to get needed money to claimants
without delay.88 One writer, in fact, reports that several years ago most of the
principal carriers operating in the liability field held a meeting with the net result
that companies writing more than 80% of the liability business adopted a
program of advancing payments in liability cases.89 It is estimated that now liter-
ally hundreds of thousands of claimants annually are being offered the benefits
of this new technique.' Thus, as soon as an automobile accident occurs involving
injury or damage, the insurer may immediately obligate itself to pay medical,
hospital, nursing, drug or property damage costs, and lost income in the case of
a wage earner or the cost of domestic help in the case of a housewife. When
there is such an advance payment, the injured party will only be asked to sign a
receipt, stating that the payments made are to be credited toward any future
settlement or judgment. In the past, such an advance payment was often con-
sidered an admission of legal liability, but now several courts have held that
advance payments are merely to be credited toward any future settlement or
judgment and are not an admission of liability."-
Another suggested reform in this area would be to offer optional no-fault
hospital-medical cost and income loss or disability protection in automobile in-
surance policies. With these coverages, payments would be made promptly to
any injured victim, regardless of who was at fault; but the fault principle could
85 IowA CoDn ANN. Senate File 1102 [2 Legislative Service 67 (Feb. 20, 1970)].
86 Hart, supra note 29, at 29; Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 74, at 187.
87 Id.
88 Des Champs, Advance Payment Techniques, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE 57 (Oct. 1966);
Graham, Advance Payment in Personal Injury Claims, 3 FORUm 208 (1968).
89 Graham, supra note 88, at 209.
90 Lenimon, Ingredients lor Reform, 6 TRIAL 56, 58 (Oct./Nov. 1970). One company
reported it was paying over $1,300,000 a month in advance payments.
91 See, e.g., Edwards v. Passarelli Bros. Automotive Serv., Inc., 8 Ohio St.2d 6, 221
N.E.2d 708 (1966); Byrd v. Stuart, - Tenn. -, 450 S.W.2d 11 (1969).
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continue to be utilized to allocate the costs to the insurance of those causing the
accidents, through intercompany arbitration after the claims were paid.
92
Thus, under the present tort system advance payments may be provided to
victims of automobile accidents in order to assure immediate compensation.
Further, if a no-fault plan were adopted, there would be at least some delay
while the injured party waited for the insurer to determine if collateral benefits
were available.
VIII. THE HIGH COST o0 INSURANCE
The biggest complaint the average consumer probably has against auto-
mobile insurance is that it costs too much. Nationwide average premium rates
for "regular" liability coverage have increased 551% during the past ten years.
9 '
Automobile insurance may cost the average insured with one car several hundred
dollars a year, but unlike other expensive products, he can derive no ordinary
physical benefits from it.
The critics of the fault system say that for every $2.20 paid in, only $1.00
is returned to victims in benefits. The remaining $1.20 is chewed up in insurance
overhead and lawyers' fees.9 ' They propose that by eliminating the fault system,
money will not be wasted on lawyers' fees, litigation fees, administration costs,
investigation expenses, duplicate recovery and an indeterminable award for
pain and suffering.9 5 A large rate reduction is envisioned under a no-fault
system.96
On the other hand, those who favor retention of the fault system look to the
compulsory aspect of the no-fault plans and examine the history of compulsory
insurance in Massachusetts and New York, claiming that these two states have
the highest automobile liability insurance rates in the nation. The compulsory
nature of no-fault insurance obviously requires government intervention in the
insurance business-a proposal which is not readily accepted by the insurance
companies.
Under the present tort system, the national average premium for the basic
limits on bodily injury liability insurance, medical payments, uninsured motorists
coverage and increased liability limits is said to be $4.56 monthly per insured
car." That would not seem to be such a high price to pay for the benefits of in-
surance coverage. Also, the authors of no-fault, in arriving at their figure of $1.00
returned for every $2.20 paid in, do not seem to consider the fact that there are
investigation and legal defense services provided to the insured as a "returned"
benefit.
It should also be noted that the consumer's dollar is certainly not being
92 See generally Denenberg, The Center Ground, 6 TRIAL 40, 41 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
93 Cahill, Automobile Liability Insurance System: Proposals for Pragmatic Reform, 57 Ky.
L. 631, 632 (1969).
94 Keeton, supra note 36; O'Connell, supra note 41; O'Connell, A Balanced Approach
to Auto Insurance Reform: O'Connell Answers His Critics, 41 U. COLO. L. Rnv. 81, 87
(1969).
95 Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 74, at 188.
96 See generally Brainard, Prices and Politics, 6 TRmsL 24 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
97 McLean, Our System of Justice Is a Strong Bulwark, 3 TRIAL 32, 33 (Oct./Nov. 1967).
98 Id. See also Auto Insurance Rate and Delay Charges Found Untrue, 9 FOR THE
DEFENSE 18 (Mar. 1968).
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taken in excessive company profits. The average profit of the property and
liability insurance companies during the period 1955-1967 was only 3.6%."
From 1956 to 1966, automobile liability premiums went up at approximately
the same rate as the consumer price index, and from 1947 to 1967 personal
income in this country increased enough so that the portion of individual income
spent for automobile liability insurance actually dropped during that twenty-
year period'0 Whenever the high cost of insurance is attacked, no consideration
is given the fact that the cost of hospital care, medical treatment, automobile
repair, and the average hourly wage-all of which make up the typical auto-
mobile accident claim-have also increased rapidly in recent years.1"'
The level of the present cost of insurance is due to the fact that perhaps as
much as 55 % of the automobile insurance premium dollar goes to pay for prop-
erty damage coverages, including damage to automobiles. "' Some figures estimate
that as much as two-thirds of the premium dollar is spent for car damage
coverages, and more than ten times as many people incur damage to their cars as
incur personal injuries. 3 Truly, this is an area of great expense which no-fault
insurance does not cover. Under a no-fault system the vehicle owner would
have to buy collision and comprehensive coverage to ease the burden of shoulder-
ing automobile repair costs, as this cost is not included in the "savings" of the
plans. The design of cars must be improved, not the reparations system, in order
to control mushrooming automobile repair costs. Something must be done on the
accident prevention level, under any system, in order to reduce the cost of in-
surance.
Moreover, there may not be any real savings realized with a no-fault system.
One study projected savings for the average New York State policyholder, under
a no-fault system, ranging from a low of $.80 to a high of $1.75 per month.'0 4
Is such a modest saving worth abandoning the entire fault system? It is said that
M. G. McDonald, chief actuary for the State of Massachusetts, had estimated,
prior to passage of such a law in his state, that a no-fault system there would
actually increase the cost of the coverage required by statute from 19 % to 35 %'Yo5
And it is claimed that a six-month study conducted by the American Mutual
Insurance Alliance to determine the cost of the AIA plan forecast an increase of
29% in automobile insurance premiums under AIA no-fault.0 0
These estimates of a possible cost increase in a plan designed to cut the
cost of insurance are due to several factors. As no-fault would pay many who
weren't paid before-namely those who were at fault-there will be an increase
99 Insurance Profits Low, 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 74 '(Nov. 1969). See also Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co. v. Comm'r of Ins., - Mass. -, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970). The Massachusetts
Supreme Court, in its opinion holding the rate reduction section of the Massachusetts "No-
Fault" law unconstitutional, set forth figures indicating that the liability companies in Massa-
chusetts actually sustained an underwriting loss in 1970.
100 Martin, supra note 57, at 488.
101 Worthington, Regulation: A Consumer Decision, 6 TRIAL 43, 44 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
102 Ghiardi & Kirchner, supra note 77, at 326.
103 Lemmon, supra note 90.
104 Kemper, supra note 63, at 21.
105 Kuhn, supra note 33, at 5; Sargent, Disaster Walks in Guise of Social Reform, 3
TRIAL 24, 25 (Oct./Nov. 1967).
106 Actuarial Study Challenges "No-Fault" Cost Savings, 10 FoR THE DEFENSE 43 (June
1969).
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in the number of claims made. Estimates as to increased claims vary from 40%
to 200%P07 Such an increase will certainly result in an increase in the overhead
expenses necessary to handle these claims. It is possible that fraud in concealing
collateral benefits and the institutioh of periodic payments will place a heavy
burden on insurance companies and increase administration and investigation
costs.
The likelihood of fraud is inherent in the no-fault plans since they provide
for recovery of a loss sustained by an insured arising out of operation or use of
an insured vehicle. 8 If an insured can connect his injury, in any manner, to the
use or operation of his car, he will be able to recover and there will be no
adversary party to contest his claim.
Furthermore, under a no-fault system every motorist will bear the burden
created by the poor driver. The system would allocate cost on the basis of the
amount of injury or damage suffered, rather than caused, by- each individual.
Either everyone would pay the same premium, the good as well as the- poor
driver, or the rates of those sustaining the most damage would be increased, since
causation or fault is no longer determined and allocated a higher cost. The
biggest risk to the insurer would be the party who sustained the most damage.
Again, no-fault plans may be very expensive for those who will be unable to
receive its benefits because they are already compensated from another source.
As mentioned above, a no-fault system would make automobile insurance a
secondary coverage since collateral benefits must be looked to first. Since the
loss allocation principle of no-fault is that motoring should pay the cost,'09 this
means many drivers will be forced to contribute premiums to automobile in-
surance companies when they know there is little possibility that they will ever
collect from the insurance company in the event of an accident.
Moreover, it appears that any savings obtained under the proposed no-fault
systems would only be obtained through a reduction in benefits."0 The victim
of an automobile accident under these plans forgoes his common law' rights
to sue in tort, have a jury trial and recover for pain and suffering. In return, he
receives a promise of lower insurance cost and assured payment of his out-of-
pocket losses where no other insurance applies.
The critics of the fault system tend to treat automobile accidents as in-
evitable, and they give very little thought to accident prevention."' Yet, fewer
accidents would mean less damage, fewer claims and fewer litigated cases.
Perhaps it would be well to shift the reform emphasis and establish some mean-
ingful accident prevention program. Vehicles could be made safer and more
durable, and the drunk driver could be removed from the road."2 A society
which developed the ,automobile should have the technology to make travel
in the automobile safe and thereby reduce the economic cost of automobile ac-
107 Bailey, Fallacies Overshadow Validity of Plan's Cost Estimates, 3 TRIAl. 45, 46
(Oct./Nov. 1967).
108 See, e.g., S. 4339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (2) (1970).
109 Keeton, supra note 36.
110 Kuhn, supra note 33, at 9.
111 See generally Keeton, supra note 40.
112 Pa. Action Comm. For Highway Safety, Some Proposals for Saving Life and Property
and Reducing the Cost of Automobile Insurance, 1970 INs. L.J. 692.
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cidents. The public does not need a cheap premium for less insurance. It needs
full protection.
IX. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE
The constitutionality of the various no-fault plans has been, for the most
part, ignored by both the critics and the proponents of the fault system. The
problem arises here in connection with the requirement of the plans that a
motorist waive his common law tort rights as a condition to using the public
highways.
In discussing the constitutional impact of Senator Hart's proposal which pro-
vides for federal regulation of insurance, one is first met with the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association. 13 In that
case, the Court held that insurance was a proper subject of federal regulation
under the commerce clause of the Constitution,114 even though regulation had
previously been left to the states.115 Congress, in reaction to this decision, passed
the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 1 6 which returned to the states the jurisdic-
tion to regulate and supervise the insurance industry. This Congressional action,
however, is usually not thought to be a permanent abdication of federal re-
sponsibility. Senator Magnuson of Washington, for example, states that the
legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress was only making a condi-
tional delegation of authority to the states, reserving the right to re-establish a
federal role if such action were needed to protect the public interest.1 It thus
appears that Congress could rely on the commerce clause in order to regulate
automobile insurance."'
If, however, the power to regulate commerce is to be relied upon as the
Congressional foundation for legislative reform, then Congress must be able to
relate the need for reform to the welfare of the national economy. If this is the
needed method of sustaining federal reform in the insurance field, one must
ask whether compensation for automobile accident losses is really rooted in
considerations having to do with the welfare of the national economy. It would
appear that the complaints against the present system are most naturally and
obviously related to humanitarian considerations and the idea of justice, and not
to the national economy. In fact, it is very questionable whether the shortcomings
in the tort system for administering automobile accident compensation have very
much at all to do with the state of our national economy. Factual documenta-
tion is not yet available to support a judgment that the evils in the present system
have a substantial adverse bearing on the national economy. Thus, it would be
very specious reasoning to predicate federal action in this area on the commerce
clause.
1 9
113 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
114 Id. at 552-53.
115 Id. at 534.
116 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1963).
117 Magnuson, Probe of Abuses, 3 TRIAL 14 (Oct./Nov. 1967).
118 Sands, Constitutionality of Automobile Accident Compensation Reform by Federal Law,
in CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REFORM 59, 68
(1970).
119 Id. at 68-93.
[Spring, 1971]
[Vol. 46:54 1]
Another constitutional problem arises under no-fault insurance because the
victim of an auto accident has no recourse to a jury trial to determine whether
and to what extent he should be compensated. The seventh amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees to every individual the right to trial by
jury in all suits at common law where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars. 2 ' Although this right has not been held to apply to state action, the
constitutions of practically every state also provide this right.' 2' The Supreme
Court has held that the national police power does not reach so far as to permit
the legislature to demand the sacrifice of a constitutionally protected right in
exchange for the conferring of a valuable privilege.'22 The valuable privilege
here is the privilege to drive on the public highways.
Thus, several writers believe that the seventh amendment is a serious obstacle
to federal legislation dispensing with jury trials for determining eligibility for
compensation in automobile accidents. 2' It is felt that the only way to curtail
this right is by constitutional amendment. 24
Workmen's compensation laws guarantee recovery to most victims while
limiting the right to trial by jury. Yet this type of compensation plan is made
acceptable because the injured workman, in the usual case, is injured by an in-
animate machine-a machine which has no capacity to be careful or careless.' 2
Moreover, unlike a no-fault system, the injured workman recovers payment from
the party most closely associated with the injury-his employer or his employer's
insurer-and at the same time retains a remedy for full damages from a tortfeasor
other than his employer."'
Another possible constitutional problem is encountered when one considers
the possible conflicts which will arise between state constitutional and statutory
provisions and the proposed federal law. For example, the Louisiana Civil
Code provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.""27 (Emphasis added.)
Many state constitutions and statutes contain such a right to legal redress of
injury.' These state provisions forbidding any limitation on the right to recover
damages for injury or death will thus clash with any federal proposal to limit
these rights. 29 The supremacy clause of the Constitution 30 would have to be
relied upon to support federal action which would compel state officials to ad-
minister a law which the state's courts would have to rule invalid under the
state's constitution or laws. The constitutional propriety of this has also been
placed in doubt."'
120 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
121 E.g., Wis. CONST. art. I, § 5: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy ...
122 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
123 See, e.g., Sands, supra note 118, at 92; Kuhn, supra note 33, at 12.
124 Sands, supra note 118, at 91.
125 Spangenberg, At What Price.. ., 3 TRIAL 10 (Oct./Nov. 1967).
126 Markus, As I See It, 6 TRIAL 70, 71 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
127 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 '(West Cum. Supp. 1970).
128 For a general discussion of state law in this area see Ruben & Williams, The Constitu-
tionality of Basic Protection, 1 CONN. L. REv. 44, 45 (1968).
129 Sands, supra note 118, at 91.
130 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
131 Sands, supra note 118, at 91.
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X. PUBLIC DESIRE FOR NO-FAULT INSURANCE
Although the public may have complaints in regard to the present liability
reparations system, it is important to try to gauge whether society desires reform
in the shape of a no-fault system. It is possible to see the trend to strict liability in
products liability cases as a sign of society's desire to shift the focus from the
defendant and his conduct to the victim and his plight. 2 From the results of
surveys which have been conducted to date, however, it appears that the public
is unwilling to do away with fault as a basis for determining who should bear the
burden of an automobile accident. For example, a Minnesota study of persons
who had served on a jury indicated that they favored retention of the fault
system.' Another poll, conducted by the Minneapolis Tribune, showed that
60% of those surveyed favored the fault method in determining reparations in
automobile accident lawsuits.' 4 And as might be expected, a poll of automobile
insurance agents showed that they were opposed to the adoption of a no-fault
system.
35
The largest study ever done on this subject was a nationwide survey by State
Farm Automobile Insurance Company, the nation's largest automobile insurer.
State Farm surveyed its eleven million policyholders and received four million
responses. Of those responding, 94% favored the present fault system. The
group likewise favored recovery for pain and suffering. 8
In the course of the study by the Department of Transportation, a survey of
public attitudes toward automobile insurance was conducted. Heads of car-
owning families were asked whether they were satisfied with auto insurance;
651% expressed satisfaction.2 7
Another study, conducted by Market Facts, Inc., indicated a majority of
those polled disapproved of no-fault insurance."8
The results of these initial studies hardly constitute a mandate to the legisla-
tures to abolish the present system of law and insurance and venture into the
unknown.
XI. CONCLUSION
Having examined the various criticisms of the fault system and the various
reasons put forth for changing to a no-fault system, one is able to conclude:
fault is not ordinarily difficult to determine; the present tort liability system is not
the reason for court congestion and delay; and reduced cost, uninsured motorist
protection, protection against cancellation and insolvency, and advance pay-
132 Franklin, supra note 3, at 785.
133 Former Minnesota Jurors Approve Fault Concept, 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 49 (Sept.
1969).
134 Minnesotans Reject Premises of Keeton-O'Connell Plan, 9 FOR THE DEFENSE 65 (Nov.
1968).
135 Agents Oppose "No-Fault," 10 FoR THE DEFENSE 18 (Mar. 1969).
136 O'Connell & Wilson, Public Opinion Polls on the Fault System: State Farm versus Other
Surveys, 1970 INS. L.J. 261, 263; Spangenberg, The Public Attitude - Let's Not Misinterpret
It, 6 TRIAL 34 (Oct./Nov. 1970); Retain the Fault System, 6 TRIAL 50 (Dec./Jan. 1969-70).
137 See Spangenberg, The Public Attitude - Let's Not Misinterpret It, 6 TRIAL 34
(Oct./Nov. 1970).
138 See Lemmon, supra note 90.
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ments can all be handled under the present system as well as, or better than,
under a no-fault system.
The no-fault advocates have misconstrued the purpose of automobile
liability insurance. It is not the primary intent of liability insurance to guarantee
that all who are injured or killed on the highway will be compensated irrespective
of the circumstances.' 9 Its purpose is instead to protect the insured from the
claims of a third party for which he may be found legally liable. Thus, a change
to a no-fault system not only changes the tort structure, but it changes the funda-
mental purpose of liability insurance as it presently exists. In addition, such a
change would require the government to compel business to sell a different com-
modity than it now offers. Is this really the direction in which we wish to move?
On the other hand, what advantages does the present system hold out to
society? It has been suggested that, at the very least, the present system is estab-
lished and well understood. 4  Moreover, although claimed by some to be an
element lacking in the present system, justice is probably best served by the
present tort liability reparations system in automobile accidents. Under our
adversary system, a person who has a claim for an injury received in an auto-
mobile accident is compelled to charge that another person was responsible for the
injury occurring. With a no-fault system the loss need only arise out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle; and recovery is gained from
one's own insurer irregardless of fault. There is no adversary party who may
challenge the claim and require proof of the loss. Also, it -seems that true basic
protection is afforded under the present system by means of: cross-examination,
personal observation of witnesses and counsel by the judge and jury, discovery
procedures (such as the right to have a claimant examined by physicians), rules
of evidence which are calculated to insure truth and fairness, and the right to
appeal'
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Whenever a legal claim is asserted against anyone, whether it be an in-
dividual or an insurance company, it is most important to ascertain the facts.
Someone must ultimately do this. There are those who believe the jury is best
able to do so:
[A]U judgment is'... basically a matter of experience and the combined
experience of 12 persons is bound to have more breadth and scope than
the experience of any one person, however learned, fair and impartial.
W ' IT hat jury [is] the finest arbiter of facts that can be had on earth
under any system of justice.1
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The idea of compelling someone to give up his right-to" a jury trial and to
certain common law remedies is not acceptable. It is possible to bring about many
needed reforms in automobile insurance without denying basic rights. In fact,
139 Gouldin, supra note 4, at 66. ' .
140 Harrington, Compensating the Injured' Claimant: The Keeton-O'Connell Plan, 44
F.R.D. 133, 135 (1967).
141 Townsend, supira note 44, at 137-38.




many suggestions for improvement have been made within the present system.14
Highway safety must be improved in order to prevent accidents and save lives;
more judges must be appointed and procedures adopted for more efficient use of
legal effort; the sometimes excesses in the contingent fee system must be regulated;
the adoption of advance payment programs must be allowed without any effect
on the determination of liability; and awards for pain and suffering must be
regulated by formulating a plan which will serve as a guide to the appraisal of
fair compensation for this element of damage. Also, statutory temporary dis-
ability insurance (programs generally designed to provide wage loss payments
for those temporarily disabled) would serve to alleviate the problem of those who
receive no compensation.'
Nationwide adoption of a comparative negligence system, such as is in effect
in Wisconsin,:' would serve to alleviate the harsh application of the principles
of fault and contributory fault which sometimes leave deserving victims un-
compensated. As one writer pointed out:
Where one party asks that another compensate him for an injury
caused by their joint negligence, the most equitable solution of the problem
would be to allow him to recover only that portion of the loss for which the
other had been responsible.4
6
Thus, under a comparative negligence system loss is distributed in relation to the
degree of each participant's negligence or fault. The harsh application of fault
and contributory fault principles is alleviated and the adversary system is left
intact.
Those who worked under a system of comparative negligence say it does
work with reasonable efficiency and ease." 7 The Wisconsin system is both just
and workable, based upon nearly forty years of practical operation and judicial
interpretation.
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Reform, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 69 (1970). See also The Cotter Plan, House Bill 7107, Conn.
Gen. Assembly '(Jan. Sess. 1969); Dann, The Cure - Motorist Protective Legislation, 53
Auto. Club of Mich., Motor News 12 (Jan. 1971). DRI Board Adopts Positive Program, 10
FOR THE DEFENSE 17 (Mar. 1969); A Study of Contingent Fees in the Prosecution of Per-
sonal Injury Claims, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 197 (1966).
144 Denenberg, supra note 92.
145 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958) provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury
to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought. but any damages allowed shall be diminished
in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
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In seeking reform we should heed the words of the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, John A. Volpe:
[he problem of motor vehicle accident compensation is far more complex
and far less easily resolved than many appear to believe.
While the present system has its obvious faults, we should not hastily
move to a system merely because it is new. Caution, common sense and
consideration of sound public policy demand that we ... move gradually
in the direction of reform....
... I am strongly persuaded that, in the long run, reform offers its
best opportunities at the state level. 49
The insurance industry should give prompt and adequate compensation to
traffic victims, but it is not necessary to destroy the concept that persons should
be liable for the consequences of their wrongdoing. No rush should be made
toward unproven plans which deny basic rights.
James D. Friedman
149 Volpe, Tampering with the Tort System, 6 TRIA. 32. 33, 36 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
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